Prof. Leonardo Felli

Research Fellow

Research Focus

    • Law and Economics, Contract Theory, Economic Theory, Political Economy, Labour Economics, Economics of Migration and Industrial Organization.

    Curriculum Vitae (excerpt)

    • 2019-present: Chair of the Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • 2019-present: Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • 2019-present: Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge.
    • 2018-2019: Head of the School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • 2018-2019: Professor of Economics, School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • 2015-2018: Head of the Department of Economics, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • 2012/2013: Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    • Apr 2009 & Apr 2007: Visiting Fellow, the Center for Economic Studies (CES), University of Munich, Munich, Germany. Spring 2008 Visiting Professor, UCLA, Anderson School of Management, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
    • Fall 2008 & Jul 2005, 2006: Visiting Scholar, Wissenschaftszentrum f ¨ ur Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin, Germany. April 2006 Visiting Scholar, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven CT, USA.
    • Jun–Aug 2004: Visiting Professor, Ente Luigi Einaudi per gli studi monetari, bancari e finanziari, Rome, Italy.
    • 2003/2004: Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, USA.
    • Jan 2002 & Mar 2001: Visiting Professor, the Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel- Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel.
    • 2001-2019: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • 1999/2000 & 1997/1998: Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA.
    • 1997-2001: Reader in Economics, Department of Economics, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • 1996/1997: Lent term Visiting Scholar, the Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, Lent term.
    • Dec 1994: Visiting Senior Lecturer, the Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel.
    • 1992-1997: Lecturer in Economics, Department of Economics, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • 1990-1992: Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02167, U.S.A.
    • 1986-1990: Ph.D. in Economics, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1990.
    • 1978-1984: Laurea in Economia e Commercio, Summa cum Laude e Dignita a di Stampa, University of Trieste, Italy, July, 1984.

    Honors, Grants and Fellowships

    • 2019- present: J. M. Keynes Senior Fellowship in Financial Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • 2000-present: Research Fellow of CEPR in the Industrial Organization programme of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
    • 1999-present: Research Fellow of CESifo in the Center for Economic Studies, Munich.
    • 2005-2007: Research Fellow of Ente Luigi Einaudi per gli studi monetari, bancari e finanziari, Rome, Italy.
    • 1999/2000: ESRC Grant on “Costly Coasian Contractual Problems and Solutions” (Ref. R000237825) joint with Luca Anderlini.
    • 1995/1997: STICERD Research Grant, London School of Economics.
    • 1985–1989: Ph.D. Scholarships: “Luciano Jona”, (San Paolo di Torino, Italy) “Admeto Pettinari”, (Bank of Italy), NATO-CNR fellowship.
    • 1984: Honour prize “Mario Strudthoff,” University of Trieste, Italy.

    Publications

    • “The Emergence of Enforcement,” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Michele Piccione), Janeway Institute Working Paper, JIWP2222, August 2022.
    • “Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry,” (joint with Giacomo Calzolari, Johannes Koenen, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Konrad Stahl), Janeway Institute Working Paper, JIWP2101, August 2021.
    • “Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms,” (joint with Franc¸ois Ortalo-Magn´ e), CEP Discussion Paper No. 394, London School of Economics.
    • “Search, Sticky Prices and Deflation,” (joint with Peter A. Diamond), revise and resubmit for the Journal of Monetary Economics.
    • “Legal Efficiency and Consistency,” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Alessandro Riboni), European Economic Review, (2020), 121(1), 103323.
    • “Costly Pretrial Agreements,” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Giovanni Immordino), Journal of Legal Studies, (2019), 48(1), 159-188.
    • “Firm-Specific Training,” (joint with Christopher Harris), Journal of Economic Theory, (2018), 175, 585-623.
    • “Complexity and Undescribability,” (joint with Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luca Anderlini), in The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros, and Luigi Zingales (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2016.
    • “Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing,” (joint with Rafael Hortala-Vallve), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, (2016), 11(3), 279-312.
    • “Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?” (joint with Kevin Roberts), Economica, (2016), 83, 172-200.
    • “Why Stare Decisis?” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Alessandro Riboni) Review of Economic Dynamics, (2014), 17(4), 726-738.
    • “Child Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race,” (joint with Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, and Leeat Yariv) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, (2014), 6(3), 133-158.
    • “Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth,” (joint with Luca Anderlini, Giovanni Immordino and Alessandro Riboni) International Economic Review, (2013), 54(3), 937-956.
    • “Active Courts and Menu Contracts,” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Andrew Postlewaite), in Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Matthew Baker and Thomas Miceli (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2013.
    • “How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company,” (joint with Francesca Cornelli), International Review of Finance, (2012), 12(2), 197-226.
    • “Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?” (joint with LucaxAnderlini and Andrew Postlewaite), Review of Law and Economics, (2011), 7(1),x14-28.
    • “Agency Problems,” (joint with Luca Anderlini) entry for the 2nd Edition of the NewxPalgrave Dictionary of Economics, Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.xBlume, Macmillan, May 2008.
    • “Costly Contingent Contracts: A Failure of the Coase Theorem,” (joint with LucaxAnderlini), in Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions, Fabrizio Cafaggi, AntonioxNicita and Ugo Pagano (eds.), Siena: Routledge 2007.
    • “If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected Lobby Your Enemies,” (joint with AntonioxMerlo), Journal of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings,x(2007) 5, 624–35.
    • “Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies,” (joint with Luca Anderlini and Andrew Postlewaite), Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, (2007), 23, 662- 684.
    • “Undescribable Events,” (joint with Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luca Anderlini), Review of Economic Studies, (2006), 73, 849-868 (lead paper).
    • “Endogenous Lobbying,” (joint with Antonio Merlo), Journal of the European Economic Association, (2006), 4, 180-215.
    • “Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem,” (joint with Luca Anderlini) Economic Journal, (2006), 116, 223-245. Re-printed in The Coase Theorem, Volume II R.A. Posner and F. Parisi (eds.). Edward Elgar, 2013, 416-438.
    • “Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts,” (joint with Luca Anderlini), Research in Economics (2004) 58, 3-30.
    • “Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation,” (joint with Luca Anderlini), Econometrica, (2001), 69, 377-411.
    • “Competition and Hold-ups,” (joint with Kevin Roberts) in Putting Economics to Work: Volume in Honour of Michio Morishima, Tony Atkinson, Howard Glennester and Nicholas Stern (eds.), London: STICERD, 2000.
    • “Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations,” (joint with J. Miguel Villas-Boas), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, (2000), 9, 453-483.
    • “Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs,” (joint with Luca Anderlini), Theory and Decision, (1999), 46, 23-50.
    • “Describability and Agency Problems,” (joint with Luca Anderlini), European Economic Review, (1998), 42, 35–59.
    • “Ex-ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures,” (joint with Francesca Cornelli), European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, (1997) 41, 475–85.
    • “Learning, Wage Dynamics and Firm-Specific Human Capital,” (joint with Christopher Harris), Journal of Political Economy, (1996) 104, 838–68.
    • “The Theory of Bankruptcy and Mechanism Design,” (joint with Francesca Cornelli) in Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, London: CEPR, 1995.
    • “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature,” (joint with Luca Anderlini), The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1994) 109, 1085–1124.
    • “Turnovers and Asymptotic Behavior of Workers,” Economic Letters, (1993) 42, 43-50.
    • “Job Matching and the Distribution of Producer Surplus,” (joint with Giuseppe Bertola), Research in Economics, (1993) 47, 65-92 and “A Note on G. Bertola and L. Felli (1993) “Job Matching and the Distribution of Surplus” Research in Economics, 47, 65-92,” (joint with Christopher Harris), Research in Economics, (1996) 50, 317-19.
    • Discussion of “Skill Mismatch, Training Systems and Equilibrium Unemployment: a Comparative Institutional Analysis” by David Soskice, in Mismatch and Labour Mobility, Fiorella Padoa Schioppa (ed.), Cambridge: C.U. Press, 1991.
    • “Do Marginal Employment Subsidies Increase Re-employment Probabilities?” (joint with Andrea Ichino), Labour, (1988) 2, 63-89.
    • “Do Firms Insure Workers, or Workers Insure Firms?” Economia e Lavoro, (1987) 21, 69-72.